The argument that high rates of unemployment in major European countries are the result of labor market institutions that create rigidities is popular but not universally accepted. This paper argues that high unemployment, in general, can be accounted for by the sluggish adoption of new technologies that happens against the background of high rates of arrival of new technologies and a generous unemployment benefit scheme. Moreover, the analysis shows that the speed with which workers accumulate job-specific skills plays a key role in determining the duration and the level of unemployment.
Introduction
After low levels of unemployment until the late 1970s, European unemployment rates became high relative to that in the United States. The deterioration in the European labor market performance was accompanied by the emergence of a persistent growth and technology gap relative to the U.S. -as measured by per capita GDP growth, labor productivity growth in the manufacturing sector, the share of information and communication technologies (ICT) in investment and its contribution to output growth. The existing gap evidences that -with a few exceptions -European countries have lagged behind the U.S. in the adoption and usage of new technologies. The simultaneous emergence of a technology deficit -resulting from slack technology adoption -and the sharp increase in European unemployment are not coincidental. The main hypotheses in this paper is that the pace of technology adoption plays a fundamental role for an economy's labor market performance and therefore differences in the level of unemployment across countries might be the result of different degrees of technology adoption and usage. I challenge the conventional view that high rates of European unemployment are the result of labor market institutions by claiming that institutions are not the major source of high unemployment per se but they rather show the tendency to amplify certain forces that promote the emergence of high levels of unemployment 1 . These forces are generated through the interplay between (a) the rate of arrival of new technologies, (b) the speed of their adoption and (c) the speed with which workers accumulate technology-specific skills and (d) the degree of turbulence, i.e. the magnitude of worker's skill depreciation in the event of a job loss. A primary aim of this paper is to formalize the hypotheses that high rates of unemployment in major European countries can be accounted for by the sluggish adoption of new technologies that happens against the background of high rates of arrival of new technologies and a generous unemployment benefit scheme. The underlying intuition is the following: In an economy where firms update their production technology rather sluggishly, workers operate a certain technology for a relatively long time, hence they accumulate substantial amounts of specific skills on that technology. The effect of these skills on wages we will refer to a as "skill effect". If these skills are not 1 People very often stress the importance of various labor market institutions for explaining high rates of unemployment in major European countries. Their line of argument is that institutions create rigidities in the labor market and prevent a fluid reallocation of labor. This argument is highly controversial. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) , for instance, notice that the institutions which generate these rigidities were also present in the 1960s and in the 1960s unemployment was much higher in the U.S. than in Europe. Taking the same line, Oswald (1997) claims that "Despite conventional wisdom, high unemployment does not appear to be primarily the result of things like overly generous benefits, trade union power, taxes or wage "inflexibility".", (Oswald, 1997 , p.1) By contrast, in a recent empirical analysis of unemployment patterns in OECD countries Nickell et al. (2005) find that changes in labor market institutions explain around 55% of the rise in European unemployment from the 1960s to the first half of the 1990s.
(fully) transferable across jobs than a displaced worker looses parts, or all, of his skills upon lay-off. In the literature, this loss is often referred to as "turbulence"
2 . The loss of human capital implies that new wage offers -that reflect a worker's current skill levelare potentially lower than the pre-displacement wage 3 . Consequently, in an environment where institutions provide generous unemployment benefits (that are proportional to the worker's previous wage income), displaced workers possess a valuable outside option. This strengthens their bargaining power in the wage negotiation and thus discourages firms to open up new vacancies. If the gap between benefit receipts and new wage offers is sufficiently large then, after a layoff, a worker might even prefer to stay out of work for a while since the value of unemployment is high relative to that of a new jobs. The duration of unemployment should therefore depend on the generosity of the benefit payments and the amount of technology-specific skills a worker has accumulated in her previous occupation. Note that the latter is affected by the frequency of technology updating. If there is high technology turnover in an economy -in the sense that firms renovate their production technology rather often -then the amount of accumulated experience on a specific technology is relatively low. On the other hand, frequent updating means that worker operate technologies that are more productive, hence also their wages will be higher. This effect will be referred to as the "vintage effect". Which of these two effectsthe skill and the vintage effect -dominates will determine the impact of learning on wages and unemployment. There is a second, potentially important channel through which the frequency of technology updates influences an economy's labor market performance. Operating a particular production technology requires certain knowledge and skills that can be seen as vintage specific. Moreover, technologies that are very "close" to ("far away" from) each other in terms of technological advancement are likely to require similar (very different) kinds of skills. As the leading edge technology (i.e. the state-of-the-art), that is available to firms, constantly advances there is a gap emerging between the technologies that were implemented by firms already at an earlier date and the technology frontier. Sluggish updating thus implies that, on average, workers operate a certain technology for a relatively long time and hence this technology gap is rather wide. Consequently, as an individual that has operated a technology that was "far" away from the frontier is attached to the leading edge technology -either through a technology update or a re- 2 In Ljungquist and Sargent (1998), for instance, turbulence refers to an increased probability of instantaneous skill loss after a lay-off. 3 There is considerable empirical evidence, some of which is provided by Farber (1993) and Jacobson et al. (1993) saying that the earnings loss suffered by displaced workers is positively related to tenure on the pre-displacement job which is consistent with the destruction of job-specific human capital when a long-term job ends. This gives support for the model's characteristic that for high tenure workersi.e. the ones that have accumulated a lot of job-specific skills -the difference between the pre-and the post-displacement wage is rather high. match with a new firm -then there is a discrepancy arising between a worker's current production knowledge and the knowledge that is required to operate the new technology. Closing this gap is costly. To make a worker's skills and abilities compatible with the state-of-the-art, firms potentially need to invest a substantial amount in costly training. Provided that these expenses do not add anything to workers productivity but are rather sunk they reduce the net present value of a job. Given that these costs are increasing in the size of the gap, slow technology adoption -which causes worker to have high tenure -potentially discourages firms to open up new vacancies since high training costs reduce the net surplus of creating new jobs. Before we proceed with providing some stylized facts let us briefly summarize the main mechanism that are shaping an economy's rate of unemployment.
• Slack technology adoption implies the accumulation of large amounts of technologyspecific skills. This potentially triggers a skill effect that drives a wedge between pre-and post-displacement earnings. Hence, for sufficiently generous unemployment benefits the value of being unemployed, i.e. a workers outside option, is large relative to the value of a new job which strengthens workers' bargaining power and discourages firms to create new jobs. A vintage effect that implies a negative tenure/relative wage profile might counteract.
• Furthermore, sluggish updating implies that workers, on average, operate technologies that are far away from the frontier. Hence their current production knowledge might not be compatible with the leading edge technology. This necessitates costly training in the case of a technology update or a re-match which reduces the net present value of a job for a firm and therefore hampers job creation.
• Rapid technical change implies that the technology gap for displaced individuals (i.e. the gap between the production knowledge used in their previous occupation and that required at the frontier) widens rather quickly. Hence training costs for newly hired workers are expected to be higher on average. This effect is more severe in economies that have slow technology adoption and therefore exhibit a relatively large fraction of long-tenured workers.
The analysis in this paper is centered around the question of how firm's technology choice and the existence of turbulence shape the unemployment dynamics in economies with different unemployment benefit regimes. The aim is to provide a proper understanding of the linkages between an economy's technology adoption behavior, labor market institutions and the dynamics of unemployment. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first two sections aim at motivating the analysis by presenting a variety of stylized facts in Section 2 and the main building blocks in Section 3. In section 4 I lay out the theoretical model and discuss the characteristics of the labor market. Sections 5 and 6 briefly discuss the calibration of the model and the algorithm that was used to solve the model. Section 7 presents and discusses the results and section 8 discusses in detail the consequences of technology learning on wages and unemployment. Section 9 concludes.
Stylized Facts Unemployment
In the postwar period until the late 1970s unemployment in Europe was low relative to that in the U.S. The data summarized in Table 1 shows that during the whole period until the 1980s unemployment in the U.S. was significantly higher than that in Europe. In the 1960s and early 70s the average unemployment rate in European was around 2.5% whereas the U.S. figure was around 5%. However, the picture had changed dramatically after 1975. Unemployment in Europe experienced a sharp and persistent increase up to a level of around 9%. On the other hand, U.S. unemployment first gradually increased in the late 70s and in the 80s but then declined over time and settled at a rate of around 5%. The use of the average rate of unemployment is, however, misleading. A closer look reveals Table 1 produced unemployment rates that are just slightly above or even below the U.S. rate. This implies that when we exclude some of the major European countries, in particular Germany, France and Italy, the famous European unemployment puzzle vanishes 4 . High unemployment is therefore not a phenomenon that is specific to Europe per se but rather to certain countries. A distinguishing feature of the U.S. labor market is its fluid nature. The average duration of unemployment is low relative to European countries which evidences a rapid reallocation of labor across sectors 5 . Table 2 shows that over the period 2000 − 2004 the fraction of unemployed being jobless for less than one month is 37.22% in the U.S. while it is around 5% in Germany, France, Spain and Italy. In contrast only 9% of the unemployed in U.S. stay out of work for more than one year whereas the number for Germany, France, Spain and Italy ranges between 40% and 58%. Evidently, high unemployment rates in some European countries are accounted for by a massive increase in the share of long-term unemployed. 
Increased Arrival Rate of New Technologies
There is evidence, some of which is provided by Cummins and Violante (2002), Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) and Pakko (2002) that the rate of arrival of new technologies has increased by the late 1970s. Cummins and Violante (2002) construct an aggregate index of investment-specific technological change and find that after average annual growth rates of around 4% in the postwar period until the late 1970s there is a sharp acceleration in the 1980s that leads to annual growth rates of more than 6% in the 1990s. As argued by Hornstein and Krusell (1996) and Yorukoglu (1998) an increase in the arrival rate of new technologies has important consequences for the process of technology adoption. A higher rate of technological change means that new technologies which differ substantially in their characteristics from existing ones are introduced at a faster rate. This raises the issue of compatibility problems between consecutive vintages. The improved technology embodied in new capital changes the technological standards and hence decreases the compatibility between old and new vintages. Yorukoglu (1998) suggests that the more advanced the new technology is relative to the existing one the lower is the initial experience with the new production technology. This implies that as the rate of technological change increases the less familiar agents will be with the new technology and hence it will be more costly to adopt it. In times of rapid technological change we should therefore see an increase in the technology gap and a rise in total adoption costs. Regarding the former, Cummins and Violante (2002) find that the technology gap in the U.S. (which they define as the gap between the productivity of the best technology and the productivity of the average practice in the economy) was 15% in 1975. In 2000 the figure had jumped to 40% suggesting a substantial decrease in the frequency of technology updates. These findings are consistent with results provided by Bessen (2002) Bessen (2002) argues that the rise in costs is specificially associated with a switch in firm's investment towards new technologies.
Technology and Growth Gap
Economic growth in Europe was strong until the 1980s but became weaker in the subsequent decades. As a result a persistent growth gap between the U.S. and most European countries has emerged since the 1980s in GDP growth as well as in labor productivity growth. By taking data on relative manufacturing output per person, Scarpetta et al. (2000) shows that the productivity level for Germany and other European countries was converging toward the U.S. level until the 1980s but has diverged since then. At the same time Europe has lagged behind the U.S. in adoption and usage of new technologies. Timmer et al. (2003) report that almost all EU countries have been seriously lagging behind the U.S. in the share of ITC investment in GDP. Consequently, IT capital stocks are much lower in Europe. It is a well established fact that slower rates of ICT investment are key in explaining the poorer European productivity performance. Figure 1 nicely illustrates the strong positive relation that can be found in the data between the level of investment in new technologies and labor productivity growth. van Ark et al. (2002) find that ICT contributes nearly as twice as much to labor productivity growth in the U.S. as in Europe. The total gap in aggregate productivity growth was 1.09 percentage points in 1995-2000. Roughly 75% of this differential can be explained by industries that are using new technologies. Lower investment rates in ICT mean that newer technologies have been adopted less forcefully. In fact Oliner and Sichel (2000) and Jorgensen and Stiroh (2000) provide convincing evidence that the U.S.-EU productivity gap can be traced back in large part to the delayed adoption of new technologies in Europe. This finding is confirmed by Daveri (2002) , Colecchia and Schreyer (2002) and van Ark et al. Table  3 . It shows that ICT investment intensities were increasing in all countries over time but (1) some most European countries started investing in ICT with a significant delay and (2) the gap between the U.S. and most European economies has not narrowed much.
Evidently the slower diffusion of new technologies is the principal factor in explaining the weaker European productivity performance. Questions arising in this context are (1) Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) suggest that strict product market regulations that curb competition hinder the adoption and diffusion of new technologies and thus have a negative effect on productivity. More evidence is provided by Gust and Marquez (2002) that find that countries with more burdensome regulatory environments tended to adopt new technologies more slowly and also had slower total factor productivity. They argue that adoption costs may differ across countries so that low adjustment cost countries adopt new technologies first. This The claim that there is a link between the pace of technology adoption, output growth and unemployment is supported by the impressive labor market and growth performance of some European countries like Sweden and the Netherlands 7 . Both countries exhibit productivity growth rates that are close to that of the U.S. and in terms of technology adoption and usage we find no evident technology deficit relative to the U.S. At the same time the unemployment rates of both economies are only slightly higher (Sweden) or even lower (Netherlands) than the U.S. rate. 6 For more evidence on the hypotheses that the lag in technology adoption can be attributed to stricter regulations in European countries, see Colecchia and Schreyer (2001) and Jerzmanowski (2006) . 7 The view that slack adoption of new technologies in Europe is causal for the observed slowdown in productivity and output growth is reflected by a statement in the European Commission's European Competitiveness Report 2001: "The growing consensus that the strong growth and productivity performance in the United States is related to increased investment and diffusion of ICT goods and services has raised concerns that the weaker economic performance of EU Member States is caused by sluggishness in the adoption of these new technologies . As an analytical framework I use a vintage technology/vintage human capital model with frictional labor markets. Firms are heterogeneous with regard to the installed production technology. When a new job, i.e. a new production unit, is created it adopts the most advanced technology that is currently available. Each period firms have the choice of keeping their old technology, upgrading the existing one, i.e. installing the leading edge technology or destroying the job. Agents are heterogeneous with respect to their human capital endowment. Workers accumulate job-specific skills that are associated with the particular technology they are working with. These skills are scrapped in the event of a lay-off. We refer to this process as turbulence. The accumulation of specific skills captures the notion of technology learning that increases the productivity of an existing production unit over time. This feature is consistent with empirical results. For instance, Jensen et al. (2001) find that the gains in productivity of an existing production plant which are due to the accumulation of experience are high and significant 8 . The specification implies that technologies of different vintages are installed in the economy at the same time. The use of vintage technology is supported by empirical findings that evidence a high persistence of firm's technology 9 . On the labor supply side I add the following micro-features that were not considered yet in the literature but definitely deserve closer attention. First, I include a labor force participation choice that is endogenous. Workers can choose to stay out of the labor force or to actively search for a job. This feature makes particularly sense in a framework that tries to explain the determinants of unemployment. Generous benefit payments pose a valuable outside option for workers. Hence, when getting unemployed, individuals might refuse to give them up and rather prefer to stay out of labor force. In previous models instead, for instance Ljungquist and Sargent (1998), unemployed individuals immediately appear on the job market after a layoff. In their framework, lengthy spells of unemployment are the result of exorbitant wage demands that are due to high benefits as an outside option. (2005) that are out of the labor force and not seeking for a job. Hence, some agents stay out of work not because they don't succeed in finding a firm that is willing to pay the demanded high wage but rather because they chose not to search. Second, in contrast to previous models, in this paper the set of attainable skill states is larger than in previous work. In my opinion a simple high/low skilled classification is insufficient when issues like wage inequality or the varying duration of unemployment across workers are the subject of consideration. When analyzing these, one has to account for the high degree of worker's heterogeneity with regard to their embodied human capital. Previous work in this field (key references are, for instance, Ljungquist and Sargent (1998) and den Haan et al. (2005)) considers primarily or even exclusively the labor supply side as the key factor in explaining differences of unemployment rates across Europe and the U.S. In this paper, however, I emphasize, in addition, a distortion coming from the demand side that is due to the existence of a discrepancy between workers' current production knowledge and the skills needed to operate the leading edge technology. This creates the necessity of providing costly training that potentially distorts job creation.
9 Work e.g. by Baily et al. (1992) and Bartelsman and Drymes (1998) suggests that each period roughly 60% of the firms keep their current level of technology. Moreover, both studies and the findings by Dunne (1994) confirm that plants with poor relative productivity can restructure their technology and move up in the relative productivity scale. This can be interpreted as clear evidence for firm's updating efforts. More explicitly, Dunne (1994) finds that old and young plants appear to use advanced technology at similar frequencies. Given that old plants had installed a different technology when they were created this implies that at a certain point in time they must have updated their technology.
The Model Vintage Technology and Skills
The economy is populated by a continuum of individuals that are either workers or entrepreneurs. Workers are either employed or not employed. Individuals belonging to the latter category can either be search active or search inactive. When an agent is search inactive she is considered to be out of the labor force. The labor force participation choice in this model is endogenous. Individuals are infinitely lived but they face a constant probability of death that is given by σ. At each point in time t there exists a range of sector-neutral technologies denoted by a t,τ ∈ {a t,0 , a t,1 , ..., a t,T } that differ with respect to their date of creation. The leading edge technology is given by a t,0 whereas a t,T is the oldest that is still in use. T can be interpreted as the critical age at which a technology is scrapped. New technologies arrive at a constant rate g. Hence a t+1,0 = ga t,0 , where a t+1,0 and a t,0 denote the leading edge technologies of tomorrow and today respectively. Newer technologies therefore have a higher productivity. Each employed worker is equipped with a certain stock of human capital, denoted by h, that is proportional to the amount of specific skills that the worker has accumulated on her current job. Specific skills, denoted by s, can take values s ∈ {s 0 , s 1 , ..., s I } where s 0 < ... < s I . s 0 and s I are, respectively, the lowest and highest potentially attainable skill level in the economy. The transition across skill levels is governed by a Markov process with transition probabilities given by p s, s . More precisely, p s, s denotes the probability that a worker with current skill level s experiences an upgrade of his technology specific skills to level s where s ≥ s. The evolution of specific skills over time can be viewed as a sort of technology learning. The amount of specific skills accumulated on a particular job -and therefore the stock of human capital -is directly related to the vintage (age) of the technology the agent is operating. I.e. s = s(τ ) where i assume s(0) = 0. This condition says that immediately after the creation of a new production unit or the renovation of an existing one, i.e. when τ = 0 there exists no job/technology specific knowledge. This specification is supported by empirical evidence provided e.g. by Cochran (1960) , Garg and Milliman (1961) , Rusell(1968) and Pegels (1969) . They find that after a change in firm's production technology, productivity initially drops and then gradually rises. The drop suggests that production knowledge does not apply equally across the old and the new production technologies and the subsequent increase evidences the existence of learning. Consequently, the stock of human capital embodied in a worker is given by
where α > 0, λ > 0. Thus, the function f h is strictly concave in s and satisfies the following property:
The functional form of f h implies that the returns to learning are positive but diminish as experience accumulates with a technology. This is consistent with findings, e.g. by Bahk and Gort (1993) and Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995 
Jobs can be distinguished along two dimensions, the vintage of the installed technology, τ and the level of specific skills embodied in the employed worker, s. In each period firms have the choice of keeping their old technology, upgrading the existing one, i.e. installing the frontier technology or destroying the job. When a firm decides to upgrade it has to incur a cost χ that is assumed to depend on the technology gap, i.e. the distance of the currently installed technology to the leading edge technology, in the following convex way
where ξ > 0, µ > 0 and ψ = 1−g −τ denotes the technology gap. The width of this gap is determined by the growth rate of the technology frontier -when new technologies arrive at a more rapid pace then the technology gap widens rather quickly. These costs can be rationalized by the fact that there might be a discrepancy between a worker's current production knowledge and the knowledge that is required to operate the newly installed technology. Thus, we can understand them as a form of training costs the firm has to incur in order to provide the worker with necessary skills that enables her to operate the new technology. The convexity of χ follows from the fact that long-tenured workers, that are highly specialized in their jobs, operate technologies that are already far away from the frontier. Hence, a substantial investment is made necessary to make the worker's skills and abilities compatible with the new production technology. However, we find that the convexity of the training cost function is not critical for our results. We obtain virtually the same results for linear costs. Given the paths of the frontier technology and the upgrading costs we know that when it is optimal for a firm belonging to skill class s to update at age T s it is also optimal at each multiple of T s . Intuitively, firm's incentive to update or not is driven by the path of the updating costs. If in skill class s it is never optimal to update then there exists a maximum age T + s at which it is no longer optimal to keep the current production technology in operation and thus the job is destroyed. When a firm renovates it adopts the leading edge technology, hence τ = 0. This implies that upon upgrading the currently employed worker looses his technology specific skills 11 . At the beginning of a period each firm and its employee observe the level of embodied skills and the age of the installed technology. Both parties are involved in a bargaining process that determines the wage. As a bargaining concept I use Nash bargaining.
Unemployment
When a production unit gets destroyed, either because of exogenous destruction that occurs at the constant rate ρ or endogenously due to technology obsolescence the worker is released to unemployment. Endogenous destruction occurs when the installed technology in a particular production unit has reached its maximum age T + s and updating is not optimal for the firm. The use of Nash bargaining implies that any break-up of existing job/worker pairs is a consensus outcome. Hence we do not observe unilateral quits by the worker. Upon lay-off a worker that has accumulated skills s in his previous occupation is entitled to unemployment benefits denoted by b(s). Benefit payments are a constant fraction φ of the average after-tax wage within the respective skill class, i.e.
, where n(τ, s) denotes the measure of workers with skills s that are operating vintage τ . ω(τ, s) denotes the respective wage. Each period, unemployed face a constant probability, γ, of loosing their benefit receipts. The introduction of benefits has the following implications for a worker's labor market participation decision. When a worker is released to unemployment she implicitly looses her technology specific skills that were accumulated during the previous occupation. This might imply that the wage offered by a new job with zero job-specific skills, ω (s = 0, τ = 0) is not higher than the pre-displacement wage ω (τ, s) 12 . Therefore, if the replacement rate exceeds a certain critical value the worker is better off by leaving the labor force. This is implied by the fact that high unemployment benefits pose a valuable outside option which the worker might not be willing to give up to for a potentially lower wage paid by a new job. Unemployed individuals can be distinguished along two dimensions, the amount of job specific skills they have accumulated in their previous occupation and the implicit technology gap. Each unemployed individual is implicitly attached to a certain vintage, i.e. the one that was operated in the last occupation. Given non-zero growth in the leading edge technology each installed vintage ages at a certain rate. Consequently, during spells of non-employment the implicit technology gap for an unemployed individual continues to widen. This implies that when an unemployed gets re-matched with new firm (that embodies the leading edge technology) there will be a discrepancy between the individual's production knowledge (that is attached to the previously operated technology) and the skills that are required to operate the new technology. Notice that, this discrepancy is exactly the same that firms face when they consider updating their production technology. As a result, newly hired worker need to be provided with costly training that makes them capable of operating the leading edge technology. Given that costs are increasing in the size of the technology gap we might observe the case that individuals that become unemployed and receive a certain amount of benefits are facing wage offers that are decreasing over time due to a widening technology gap (which implies that the required training becomes more and more costly). In addition high replacement rates are likely to affect firm's updating decisions. Given the possibility of job-quits it is clear that the technology updating decision has to be taken jointly. I.e. firms can not update against the will of the employee. Now, imagine the following scenario: if the post-update wage is low relative to the current wage and replacement rates are rather high than an update would make a worker worse off since he would loose his high outside option (that is determined by the current wage ω (τ, i)). As a result the worker can potentially enforce the postponement of the date of renovation.
The Labor Market
The labor market is frictional. This means that at each point in time there exist a certain number of open vacancies denoted by v and a pool of search active individuals, u. The total number of searcher is given by u = τ s,j∈{+,−} u j (τ, s) where j indicates whether or not the individual receives unemployment benefits, j = + or not, j = −. τ indicates the individual's distance to the frontier and s indicates the amount of skills accumulated in the previous job . New matches are determined by a matching function that is homogeneous of degree one, bounded above by min{v, u} and increasing in its both arguments.
The probability that a firm meets a search active individual with previous skills s, benefit entitlement j and distance τ is given by
The existence of a matching functions in the labor market implies that search active workers in each pool trigger a congestion effect on each other. The more individuals are in the pool the lower is the probability of encountering a vacancy. The same is true, of course, for vacancies. Therefore, firm's incentive to post a vacancy is strongly affected by the tightness in the labor market. Government
The task of the public sector in this economy is to collect taxes on labor income and to redistribute the revenues in the form of unemployment benefits. The government is assumed to run a balanced budget every period, hence τ w W t = B t , where W is the total wage bill, τ w is the tax on labor income and B denotes total benefit payments.
Value functions
Given the growth in technology there exists a natural trend in the model's key variables.
De-trending by a t,0 , therefore, yields a stationary representation. In order to fill a vacant job firms have to actively search for workers. This is done by posting vacancies. Denote with V the value of a vacancy and let κ be the cost of keeping the vacancy open. Given free entry, in equilibrium all gains from posting vacancies must be exhausted, hence V = 0. Or in other words the cost of opening up a vacancy must equal the expected return. The implied zero-profit condition is
σ is the probability that a worker dies between two consecutive periods.
is the net value of a new job for a firm that gets matched with a worker that features the characteristics (j, τ, s). Notice that the term on the right hand side represents the expected profit. Given the possibility of getting matched with any possible worker the firm assigns probabilities to each possible match. This condition pins down the degree of labor market tightness in equilibrium. At the beginning of a period each firm and its employee observe the level of embodied skills and the age of the installed technology. At each point in time the choice set for the firm -which we denote by Υ -contains the following actions:
1−produce with the current technology 2−install the leading edge technology 0−destroy the job Given the wage rate, the value of a job for a firm that operates vintage τ and employs a worker with skills s writes:
ρ is the rate of exogenous job destruction, τ + = τ + 1 is the next periods age of the currently installed technology, β is the discount factor and y (τ, s) − ω (τ, s) denotes instantaneous profits. When the current production technology is kept in operation, the value of the job next period is J τ + , s with probability p s, s where s ≥ s 13 . This captures the notion of worker's technology learning during spells of employment. If the firm decides to update it has to incur training costs χ(τ ) that depend on the technology gap 14 . A worker can be employed, unemployed and search active and unemployed and not search active, hence we can define three value functions that depend on the actual status of employment.
• E (τ, s) -the value of being employed for an individual with skill level s that is operating vintage τ
• S j (τ, s) -the value of being search active for an individual associated with vintage τ that was of skill type s when she got laid-off. If j = + (j = −), she is (not) entitled to unemployment benefits
• O j (s) -the value of being search in-active for an individual that was of skill type s in the last occupation.
Notice that the value of being search-inactive does not depend on the particular vintage the individual is attached to. Exogenous job destruction does not apply to newly matched job/worker pairs. Hence, a job/worker relation can not break up for exogenous reasons immediately after the match. Any worker that is out of the labor force is confronted with the choice to remain search inactive or to start looking for a new occupation. We denote these decisions by Ψ = 0 and Ψ = 1 respectively. The value of being search-active -that is conditional on the worker's benefit entitlement -can be written as
Note that with probability p(θτ ) a searcher gets matched with a vacancy in which case he would receive the value E j (τ, s). If no match takes place in the current period then the individual might loose his unemployment benefits with probability γ. The value of being search in-active for a worker is given by
Notice that for search inactive individuals the vintage class is irrelevant since they are not directly connected to the labor market. A worker might decide to stay out of the labor force if her current unemployment benefits b(s) are high relative to what a new job rewards. Let W j (τ, s) be the maximum value of being non-employed for a type τ individual that had skills s before lay-off. j is again an indicator for the individual's benefit entitlement. We have to keep track of a worker's benefit entitlement because in the case of a match it will determine a worker's bargaining power in the wage bargain. A worker not receiving benefits has a lower outside option and has, therefore, also a lower reservation wage. The maximum value of non-employment is given by
The choice set of an employed worker, denoted by Ξ, consists of the following actions:
−stay with the current employer 0−quit First, for notational convenience let's define the surplus of a job for a worker that stays with the current firm.
The value is determined by the worker's after-tax wage income and the present value of the future surplus. When no exogenous destruction occurs then the worker might enjoy an appreciation of his skill level captured by the first term inside the bracket. The realized value of employment for a worker is dependent on the intended action of the entrepreneur. If the entrepreneur plans to update (keep) the technology, i.e. Υ = 2 (Υ = 1), the worker compares his current outside option with the post-update (continuation) value of the job.
Notice that when making her choice the worker always considers his current outside option as the relevant one. Also in the case of Υ = 2. The cooperative nature of decision making within this framework implies that the firm/worker pair seeks to maximize the joint surplus of the job at each point in time. No action can be taken against the will of a particular party. When we take the joint surplus of each joint action as the underlying value for comparison we get the following condition
Note that what counts for the worker is the net surplus of an update that is given by E + (τ, s)−W + (τ, s). If his current outside option is high relative to the post-update value of the job then the update might not take place. To make the worker agree on an change in the technology the gain in the job-value must be sufficiently high to compensate the loss of the current outside option. This means that high replacement rates -which lead to valuable outside options -potentially create delays in the adoption of new technologies. Conditional on the decision that was taken, the joint surplus of a job, defined by Ω(·, ·), is given by
Optimizing behavior
The objective of each worker is to maximize expected wealth that is given by the infinite stream of future income
Conditional on the employment status, i ∈ {e-employed, s-searching, o-out of the labor force} and the benefit entitlement status, j ∈ {+-receive, − -not receive} the worker faces the following constraint
where I (i = ·) and I (j = ·) are an indicator functions that shape the constraint according to the worker's actual employment and benefit status. Without loss of generality I assume the existence of just one entrepreneur that receives all the profits in the economy. Given that there is no capital accumulation, the entrepreneur's objective is to maximize the infinite stream of future income The entrepreneur's income is given by profit income Π net of total training costs, C and vacancy costs.
Wage setting
In the bargaining process a job/worker pair chooses the wage rate in order to maximize the Nash product which is given by (J(τ, s) ) η E(τ, s) − W + (τ, s)
1−η
Here we need to distinguish between two cases. Firm/worker pairs that continue an existing relation and newly matched pairs. The difference stems from (1) the existence of the training costs a firm has to pay after a successful match and (2) the underlying characteristics of the worker it got matched with. Newly matched workers differ with respect to τ and s and so does their outside option in the first-period wage bargain. From the second period onwards the worker's current outside option is uncoupled from her previous employment history. As a result we get a two-tier wage system that contains two wage functions -one for continuing relationships and one for newly matched job/worker pairs. A job/worker pair that continues the existing relationship a chooses a wage that satisfies
1−η η indicates the firm's weight in the bargain. As before, J(τ, s) is the value of a job for a firm and E(τ, s) − W + (τ, s) is the net value of employment for a worker. Optimality implies that
Using the value functions we can write the wage as
A newly matched job/worker pair solves
Solving the model
The solution to the model is a set of policy functions that characterize the optimal decision behavior of workers, firms, individuals that are out of the labor force and firms with dormant jobs. In the case of a firm/worker pair the relevant state variables are the vintage of the installed technology and the level of specific skills. Given a certain state, the policy function gives the optimal decision that is contained in the set {keep on producing, update the technology, destroy the job}. Notice that decisions are takes jointly. The policy function for a non-search active unemployed determines whether or not the individuals starts actively searching for a job. The relevant state variables are the skill level the worker reached in her previous occupation and her current distance to the technology frontier. The free entry condition that results in the zero (expected) profit condition implicitly determines the vacancy posting behavior of firms with a dormant job. Notice that when optimizing, firms and unemployed take matching probabilities as given. Solving the model reduces to finding a fixed point (τ w , θ) that balances the government budget constraint -and yields ex-post matching probabilities that are consistent with agents' exante beliefs. The algorithm that is constructed to this end is structured in the following way. In an inner loop agents solve their maximization problem taking the tax rate τ w and the tightness θ as given. After each loop one can use the implied stationary distributions of firms, workers and unemployed across vintages and skill levels to update the value of θ leaving the tax rate unchanged. The inner loop has converged when the value of θ is found that is consistent with agents' beliefs. Then, using the implied stationary distributions one can compute aggregate variables, including total government expenditures and revenues.
In an outer loop, these values are subsequently used to update the guess of τ w in a way such that the government budget constraint is balanced. Once the fixed point in τ w is found the model is solved. Hence we can characterize the equilibrium of the model as follows. The equilibrium consists of
• a wage schedule ω(τ, s) and a firm's policy function T (τ, s) that maps into the action space {keep, update, destroy}, so that the joint surplus of each firm/worker pair is maximized
• a labor market tightness θ that ensures zero expected profits from posting vacanies and
• a tax rate τ w that guarantees a balanced government budget.
Calibration
The model period is set equal to half a quarter. In total there are 11 parameters (see Table 4 ) that need to be calibrated. Seven of them -i.e. (β, σ, η, α, λ, d, ξ) -are calibrated "externally" by using existing micro-evidence. The discount factor β = 0.9945 is chosen so that the implied annualized real interest equals 4.5%. People of working age face a constant probability of dying σ = 0.0025. Hence, on average, they spend 50 years in the labor force. Firm's bargaining weight, η is equal to 0.5 which is also the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the stock of vacancies. The learning by doing literature is filled with estimates of learning 15 . For calibrating the elasticity of firm's output with respect to experience I follow Klenow (1998) and set λ = 0.32. The value of α = 0.3347 is chosen so that the progress ratio i.e the ratio of peak to initial productivity is equal to 1.2. Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) report progress ratios from dozen empirical studies. Their suggested range is 1.14 − 2.9. Thus, the value that I consider is a rather conservative choice. Calibrating the parameters of the cost function is not an easy task given that the empirical literature is silent regarding training/updating costs. However, there exists a consensus that training costs are a convex function of the technology gap 16 . Therefore, I set ξ = 1. The choice of the second parameter in the cost function will be discussed shortly. The transition probabilities of the Markov process governing skill accumulation are calibrated so that intra-firm technology learning lasts, on average, for 10 years. This value is consistent with findings by Bahk and Gort (1993) years. For the welfare-state economy there are two more parameters to calibrate. The replacement rate is set equal to 45%. The OECD reports replacement rate for the early 1970s in Europe lying in the range between 30% (Germany) and 50% (Netherlands). The semi-quarterly probability of loosing the benefit entitlement is γ = 0.0417. Hence, people receive benefits, on average, for 3 years. Given the differences for the institutions, the same Laissez-Faire job destruction rate ρ rate will generate a steady state unemployment rate of 5.2% in the WS economy. However, average unemployment until the early 70s in Europe was around 3.5%. We therefore need a lower separation rate, ρ = 0.0137 in order to match low European unemployment. As a benchmark I set the annual growth rate of the leading edge technology equal to 2.5%. 
Results
The focus of the paper was on providing a proper understanding of the links between firms' technology adoption behavior, labor market institutions and the labor market performance of an economy. The analysis was motivated by the fact that there are substantial and highly persistent differences in unemployment rates between major European countries and the U.S. These differences emerged after the late 1970's at which time there has also been a major increase in the arrival rate of new technologies which caused a significant technology gap between several European countries and the U.S. Given these observations it is clear that we need to evaluate the model along two different dimensions. First we need to consider a pre-1975 period that is characterized by a low rate of arrival of new technologies. The outcomes of this scenario are then put in contrast with the results of a post-1975 scenario where arrival rates are high. Secondly, in order to mimic the existing technology gap between (and among certain) European countries and the U.S. we need to account for differences in technology updating which is done by considering various different cost scenarios. It is not the aim of the paper to explain why Europe has been lagging behind the U.S. in the implementation and usage of new technologies but it takes this gap as given an seeks to analyze its consequences for the local labor markets. As mentioned at the outset, cross-country differences in the frequency of technology updating are likely to be the result of different regulatory environments. There is a bulk of empirical studies arguing that restrictive regulatory practices in a number of European countries have impinged on firm's incentives to adopt new technologies by raising the costs of a technology upgrade and therefore slowing the rate of adoption. These studies together with Figures 2 suggest that there is substantial heterogeneity in the nature of regulatory environment across European countries which translates into differences in the underlying adoption-cost structure. In light of this we consider a number of different cost scenarios to mimic the observed heterogeneity in the technology adoption behavior. To this end we pick values for the cost parameter µ in the range 0.024 − 0.057. This range yields average updating costs that are comparable with 4.21 − 13.49 weeks of average first period postupdate wage payments. Higher costs curb firms' incentives to adopt new technologies, hence we observe firms with higher costs updating their production technology relatively less frequently. This pattern is reflected in Table 5 which depicts pre-75 outcomes of the calibrated matching model and contrasts the results of the laissez-faire economy with that of a welfare state economy. Given the benchmark parametrisation firms in both economies update their production technology every 14.44 quarters in the laissez-faire economy and -depending on the respective cost structure -every 14.66 − 24.64 quarters in the welfare state economy. A a consequence of different costs the welfare state suffer from a technology deficit relative to the laissez faire in the range 0 − 10 quarters 17 . Given the frequency of updates the implied technology gap -i.e. the average distance to the leading edge technology ranges from 8.59 − 11.97 quarters. The percentage of unemployed with spells less or equal than 3 months in the laissez-faire economy is around 81.05% which actually matches data for the U.S. (81.57%, see OECD) pretty well. The figures for the welfare state outcome are substantially lower (53.34% − 69.94%). The OECD does not provide pre-75 data on the duration of European unemployment but we believe that our results can reproduce the less fluid nature of the labor market in a classical welfare state fairly well. The model does also well in predicting the percentage of long-term unemployed in the laissez-faire economy. The figure produced by the model, i.e. 3.46% is close to what U.S.-data reveals, i.e. 4.58%. The figure for the welfare state is substantially higher -i.e. it ranges from 8.22% -17.03% -emphazising that long-term unemployment was a severe problem for European economies already in the 70s. On the whole, the steady states for the welfare state and the laissez-faire economy generated by the baseline parametrisation are broadly consistent with the main labor market features of the pre-75 era. One of the stylized facts presented at the outset reveals that, in the late 1970's, there has been a substantial acceleration in the arrival of new technologies. To pattern technology growth in the post-75 period we set the growth rate of the technology frontier g equal to 4%. Given that the firm's decision to adopt a new piece of technology is state and not time dependent we would expect agents to update more frequently in periods of rapid technical change. State-dependency in this context implies that if it is optimal for a firm to update at a certain critical size of the technology gap given by z = 1 − g −τ than increasing g just means that the same z is already reached at a lower τ . However, as argued previously a higher rate of arrival of new technologies raises the issue of compatibility problems between consecutive vintages and therefore adjustment costs are expected to rise. To account for the increase in adoption costs in the post-75 period we re-calibrate the cost parameter µ and set µ = 0.0668. This generates a steady state adoption cost to output ratio of 6.5% which is the same as the one for U.S. in the post-75 period as reported by Bessen (2002) . Given the lack of similar estimates for European countries we determine µ for each of the welfare state scenario in the following way. Bessen (2002), Cummins and Violante (2002) and Yorukoglu (1998) among others argue that the rise in adoption costs is due to vintage-specific compatibility problems that are triggered by higher rates of technical change. Given that the rate of technological progress increased uniformly in the U.S. and in Europe we should observe the same compatibility problems in European countries as well. Hence we can expect European firms being confronted with an increase in costs of a similar order of magnitude 17 Notice that a deficit of 6 quarters between two economies means that the straggler updates its technology, on average, 6 quarters later than the leader.
relative to that in the U.S. In the calibration we, therefore, pick the post-75 value of µ so that the relative increase in updating costs for each of the different updating scenarios in the welfare state case exactly matches the increase in costs in the laissez-faire economy. Table 6 reveals that an increase in the arrival rate raises the unemployment rate in the laissez-faire economy by about 2.27 percentage points. This is almost exactly what we observe for laissez-faire economies with rapid technology adoption like the U.S. In the data we see a jump in unemployment in the late 1970's that leads to an average unemployment of 6, 38% for the period 1975-2004. This increase in unemployment is fueled by an increase in the duration of unemployment which is also reflected in the data. In the period 1975-2005 the average spell of unemployment lasted for 15.33 weeks which is slightly less then what the model predict. Not surprisingly the cost increase leads to a fall in the frequency of technology updates. In the post-75 scenario firms update on average every 20.74 quarters which is roughly 6 quarters later than in the baseline case. Comparing the first column in Table 5 and in Table 6 we can make the observation that the simulated rise in the arrival rate of new technologies that triggered a rise in updating costs had, on the whole, a rather modest impact on the performance of the labor market in the laissez-faire economy. This suggests that the economy did not switch to a different steady state after the jump of arrival rate in the late 1970's. The effects in the welfare state economy, however, are more diverse. What we see in Columns 2 − 7 of Table 6 is that an increase in the growth rate of the state-of-the-art technology and a simultaneous increase in technology adoption costs can lead to a substantial deterioration in the performance of the labor market. For the moment, let's focus on the outcomes in columns 4 − 8. Increasing g to 4% and allowing for an initial technology gap of 4 quarters drives up unemployment to 7.48%. A gap of 6 years results in 8.78% whereas a gap of 10 quarters pushes up unemployment to 11.67%. These figures broadly match post-75 unemployment rates of major European welfare state economies that exhibit a sizable technology deficit. Examples are Germany (7.31%), EU-15 (9.66%), France (10.23%) or Italy (10.74%). The intuition behind these results is the following. Slow adoption of new technologies in combination with an increased rate of their arrival has two major effects on unemployment. First, sluggish updating implies that workers have, on average, high-tenure and hence they accumulate a substantial amount of specific skills on a particular technology. Table  6 confirms that the average skill level is up to 20% higher in an economy that updates less frequently. The amount of accumulated skills determines an individual's wage and thus also her unemployment benefits. Thus a high degree of specialization implies that displaced workers with high tenure have a valuable outside option which strengthens their bargaining power when getting re-matched with an open vacancy. To compensate firms for the loss in surplus, labor market tightness θ has to adjust in a way so that firms can fully recover the expected cost of creating new jobs. As a result, the vacancy finding rate declines which raises the average duration of unemployment. The results in Table  6 confirm that economies which are significantly lagging behind the frontier have a substantially higher average duration of unemployment. However, there is another effect that suggests a negative relative-wage/tenure relation and therefore potentially counteracts the first effect. When firms update rather frequently, their employees operate technologies that are close to the frontier and hence they are relatively more productive. Higher productivity translates into higher wages and therefore fast-updating/high-productivity firms are expected to pay higher wages 18 . Which of these two effects dominates depends on the speed and the scope of technology learning relative to the growth in the technology frontier. If a worker accumulates substantial amounts of technology specific skills rather rapidly then the associated productivity enhancing effect might initially offset the negative effect for a firm's relative productivity that is induced by positive growth in the technology frontier. However, the scope for technology learning is bounded. Consequently, after a certain amount of time the negative effect stemming from a widening technology gap will dominate implying that the within-firm wage will grow slower than the wage payed at (or close to) the technology frontier. For our baseline calibration that implies a rather modest degree of learning we find that within-firm wage growth is entirely driven by the latter effect 19 . To check the robustness of our results with regard to the learning technology we will consider different learning scenarios in section 8. The second major channel through which the frequency of technology updates influences an economy's labor market performance works as follows. High tenure also means that a worker (or to be more precise: the technology she is operating) is, literally, relatively far away from the frontier. When such a worker is displaced and re-matched with a new job her current production knowledge might not be compatible with the state-of-the-art. Hence, long-tenured workers require substantial amounts of costly training which enables them to operate the new technology. This diminishes firm's prospects of creating jobs leading to an adjustment in tightness in the same direction as just explained. In fact in our model, average training costs in an economy with low frequency updating are 2.45 times higher than those in an economy with high frequency updating. As a consequence vacancy creation is lower by 29.91%. For high rates of g, this effect gets more severe. Unemployed people suffer from positive technology growth since their respective distance to the frontier widens over time. An individual's distance determines her attractiveness to firms through the required amount of training expenses. When the arrival rate of new technologies is rather high than unemployed people are, on average, further away from the frontier and hence job creation becomes relatively more costly. In our model the cost differential between high/low frequency updaters increases by 7.8%. The existence of unemployment benefits further aggravates the problem. Benefits inherently raise the duration of unemployment and thus jobless people in the welfare state are longer exposed to a widening individual technology gap than they would be in the laissez-faire economy. The positive relation between the level of unemployment in an economy and the time that passes by until firms update their production technology is depicted in Figure 3 . There, the solid and the dashed lines graph the outcomes of the welfare state for the pre-75 and the post-75 era respectively. The Figure has to be read as follows. Each point on the solid line represents a particular pre-75 scenario that generates a certain rate of unemployment and a technology gap 20 . When we increase g to 4% the economy jumps to the point on the dashed line that is exactly above the respective pre-75 location on the solid line. Evidently, for g = 4% unemployment rates in the welfare economy reach high levels rather quickly as the gap widens. The results in columns 2 − 3 in Table 6 reveal that unemployment rates in a welfare state economy that provides generous unemployment insurance need not necessarily be high. In both specifications the cost parameter µ is chosen so that updating frequencies are virtually the same as in the laissez-faire economy. Thus, there is virtually no technology deficit. The unemployment rates we get in this case are between 5.48% − 6.52% which is not too far from the figure in the laissez-faire economy but, more importantly, it is substantially lower than the rates in welfare states that suffer from significant technology gaps. Therefore, the key factor that determines the level of unemployment is clearly the frequency of technology updates. Furthermore, unemployment benefits are not the main driving force of high rates of unemployment but they are rather a factor that promotes their emergence in economies that have sluggish technology updating. A closer look at European labor markets reveals that economies that provide generous benefit payments but exhibit a zero -or just a small technology gap perform remarkably in terms of labor market indicators. Notable examples are Sweden (with an unemployment rate of 5.27%), Netherlands (5.72%) or UK (7.47%). Our model can reproduce this pattern perfectly well. The percentage of unemployed with spells greater or equal than 6 months in the welfare state with low frequency updating ranges from 40.39% to 58.59% which actually matches data for welfare states like Germany (39%), Spain (51.6%) or France (55.1%) pretty well 21 .
Likewise, the results for welfare states with high frequency updating (25.92% − 35.38%) can match up real-world counterparts like Sweden (25.44%) or Austria (37.75%). Also the result for the laissez-faire economy (i.e. 17.47%) is consistent with the corresponding U.S. figure, (15.53%) 22 . It is well known that the persistent increase in European unemployment rates was primarily driven by an increase in the fraction of long-term unemployed. 21 See Table 1 in Ljungquist and Sargent (2002) 22 Data is taken from the OECD Inflow rates into unemployment were roughly the same in the pre-and the post-1980's era. Outflow rates i.e. the hazard rates of gaining employment, however, dropped significantly after the late 1970's. As a consequence, the duration of unemployment and therefore the fraction of long-term unemployed was rising. This phenomenon is reproduced remarkably well by our model. The results in Table 6 show that both indicators experience a significant increase in the post-75 period. The duration of unemployment was generally low in the pre-75 era but experienced a dramatic increase as the rate of arrival of new technologies started to accelerate. The key factor that distinguishes the pre-and the post-75 period and drives the results in our model is the accelerated rate of arrival of new technologies. In the previous experiment we set g = 4%, but in order to get a more complete picture we consider also growth rates of 3.5% and 4.5%. Arguably, a higher g -that creates more severe compatibility problems and consequently causes higher adoption costs -further delays the process of adoption, but the relative distance between the Laissez-Faire and the Welfare state economy remains virtually unchanged. This is not surprising given the way we calibrated the post-75 value of the cost parameter µ 23 .
The effects of a high g on the average duration and the rate of unemployed are dramatic. This is best reflected by Figure 4 that plots post-75 unemployment rates for g = 3.5% and 4.5% respectively. An important observation we can make is that economies in which firms update rather frequently are least affected by high rates of arrival of new technologies. The difference in unemployment rates for g = 3.5% and g = 4% are comparatively small. However, this gap widens quickly as we move to the right that is as we lower the frequency of updating. The underlying intuition behind this pattern is as follows. A rise in g that is accompanied by an increase in adoption costs triggers two effects that are reinforcing each other. Higher costs slow down the process of updating, consequently workers will be operating a certain technology for a longer time. This implies that when becoming unemployed their individual distance to the frontier will, on average, be bigger than it would be under a lower g. As a consequence, the training costs that are required to update a workers skills in case of a re-match will be higher, which in turn discourages firms of opening up new vacancies and hence it increases unemployment. Moreover, a high g means that the individual technology gap for already unemployed workers is widening at a faster rate which again causes higher training costs and therefore discourages job creation. The existence of generous unemployment benefits is a widely used argument to explain high rates of European unemployment. It is further argued that the removal or a reduction of these would substantially contribute to an improvement in the performance Figure 4 : Unemployment for g = 3.5% and 4.5% of local labor markets. Evidently, cutting benefits in our model would, for sufficiently high updating frequencies, definitely lower unemployment. However, the results depicted in Table 6 , show that even within a welfare state that provides generous payments, low levels of unemployment are achievable. If firms under the welfare state scenario choose a similar updating frequency than firms in the laissez-faire economy then the increase in unemployment is slightly higher than under laissez-faire though, the unemployment rate, however, levels out at relatively moderate levels. Based on these observations we may suppose that what matters for an economy's level of unemployment is primarily the rate of technology turnover or the speed with which firms adopt newly available technologies. The generosity of publicly provided unemployment insurance is rather of second order importance only. To provide further support for this hypotheses we conduct another experiment in which we vary the level of generosity of insurance. To this end we pick a replacement rate φ = 0.25% and compare the outcome with what we get for φ = 0.65%. The results are depicted in Table 7 . Notice that we picked cost scenrios that create an initial technology gap of 0, 4 and 8 quarters. Evidently, there is not much gain from cutting benefits. Reducing the replacement rate to 25% would lower total unemploment by a mere 0.64 − 1.04 percentage points depending on the initial technology gap. More importantly, one should not overlook the dramatic increase in unemployment in an economy that provides just minor unemployment insurance but suffers from large technology gaps. Suppose φ = 0. 25 Table 7 : Post-75 steady states for different replacement rates generate an unemployment rate of around 9.25% which exemplifies once again that very slack technology adoption can have serious consequences for the labor market even in economies that do not provide generous benefits.
8 Do skills matter? The effects on wages and unemployment As noted previously, under the baseline calibration, the effects of technology learning on the accumulation of skills, wages and the unemployment rate are rather modest. This is implied by the fact that (1) the scope for technology learning is rather limited and (2) the speed of learning is relatively slow. On average, agents tap the full potential of a technology only after 10 years, which, given (1) a separation rate of ρ = 0.0137 and (2) technology updates that occur, on average, every 4.75 − 8.25 years will happen very rarely. Moreover, the progress ratio, that is the ratio of initial to peak productivity is 1.2. This means that advances in productivity induced by technology learning amount to 20% at most. This value lies in the range 1.14 − 2.9 of possible progress ratios reported by Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) but to get a more complete picture and to better assess the effects of learning on wages and unemployment we consider alternative learning scenarios in this section. In the baseline model we find that net wages in the economy with frequent technology updates are, on average, 11.8% higher than wages in the economy with low technology turnover 24 . This is not surprising given the light effect of skills on wages.
The relatively higher wage stems from the fact that workers in an economy with frequent updating operate technologies that are closer to the frontier and are, therefore more productive. In order to isolate the net effect of skills on wages (henceforth called "skill effect") we first compute the wages that would be payed in an economy in which no learning occurs. In this way we are able to identify the relative difference in wages that is solely due to the different vintages that are in place (this effect we call the "vintage effect"). We find that the vintage effect accounts for 15.46% of the wage differential between in/frequent updating economies. We next reintroduce technology learning according to the baseline calibration and we find that the wage differential shrinks to 11.80%. In an economy that updates rather infrequently technologies are kept longer in operation. Hence workers accumulate more skills which translates into higher wages. Given only the skill effect, wages in late-updating economies would be, on average, 3.57% higher than the average wage in fast-updating economies. This is rather modest. Increasing the speed of learning does not change much. If we increase the speed with which skills are accumulated so that the full potential is reached, on average, after 5 (2.5) years the skill effect amounts to a wage differential of 4.41% (4.7%). However, the picture changes substantially when we consider higher values of the progress ratio, i.e. when we increase the scope of learning. When we set the progress ratio to 1.5 and consider 10, 5 and 2.5 years of learning we get that the skill effect amounts to 8.33%, 10.65% and 11.4% respectively. More and faster learning therefore leads to higher wages. In an economy that provides unemployment insurance one would expect higher wages causing higher unemployment. This is not the case in our model, though. Comparing two otherwise identical economies that differ just with respect to the speed or the scope of technology learning we see that unemployment will always be lower in the fast-learning economy. This is not surprising. Technology learning implies that workers can raise a plant's level of productivity at no cost. Consequently, firms exhibit a higher average productivity in economies that feature learning. This implies further that the value of a job for a firm will be higher which is expected to stimulate job creation. This feature is also generated in our model. In the baseline scenario average workers productivity exceeds that of an otherwise identical economy that features no technology learning by 14.3%, as a result job creation is higher by 19.18% and the unemployment rate is lower by 1.73 percentage points 25 . If we increase the speed or the scope of learning these effects clearly become more pronounced. The conclusion we can draw from these observation is intuitive. The more workers can learn about a certain technology, i.e. the more they can raise its productivity above its initial level, the higher will be the value of a job for a firm and hence, the more profitable it will be creating new jobs.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to provide a proper understanding of the linkages between an economy's technology adoption behavior, labor market institutions and the dynamics of unemployment. To this end, a labor market matching model was constructed that has been augmented by an endogenous technology choice by firms and a skill accumulation technology for employed workers. The outcomes of this model suggest that the frequency of technology updates in an economy is a key determinant of the performance of the local labor market. Moreover, the divergence of unemployment rates between major European countries and the U.S. can be understood taking account for the different speed of technology adoption across both countries. The analysis suggests that the increase in the rate of arrival of new technologies in the post-75 period and the simultaneous emergence of a technology gap between Europe and the U.S. are the main driving forces of the persistent increase in European unemployment rates. Evidently, there has been a switch in steady states in Europe whereas unemployment rate in the U.S. returned rather quickly to the pre-75 steady state level. Furthermore, the results of the paper reject the popular but highly controversial hypotheses that generous unemployment benefits are the main reason for high unemployment in Europe. The analysis reveals that even in welfare state economies that provide generous benefits, low rates of unemployment can be achieved by keeping the frequency of technology updates sufficiently high. This results suggests that economies that are lagging behind in the adoption and implementation of new technologies will experience a significant deterioration in their labor market performance irrespective of the generosity of the benefit system. There is an evident policy implication coming out of this conclusion. Rather than thinking about cutting back unemployment benefitswhich might create large losses in welfare -policymakers should rather create conditions that prevent the emergence of a technology deficit. This would include subsidizing the adoption and use of technologies and, equally important, subsidizing the training of unemployed people, for instance, by providing state-financed unemployment training. The latter measure would ensure that the production knowledge embodied in jobless people would not drift away from the state-of-the-art. This in turn facilitates the re-match with a new job since it becomes less costly for the firm to hire workers.
